

Annex I. Israeli agribusiness profiles and their operations overseas

Afimilk in Vietnam and Russia

Afimilk is an Israeli dairy technology company that also specialises in building “turnkey” dairy farms overseas. It was founded by Kibbutz Afikim - Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd but is now majority owned by the Israeli private equity firm Fortissimo Capital Management Ltd. Afimilk claims to have activities in over 50 countries, with its technologies used on 15,000 dairy farms. According to Who Profits, Afimilk builds and supplies dairy operations in the illegal settlements of Palestine's West Bank.¹

One of the company's largest overseas projects is in Vietnam. Afimilk signed a deal in 2010 to construct and manage a 45,000 cow mega-dairy farm operation in Nghệ An Province with the dairy company TH Group, its Vietnamese partner.² The initial estimated cost for the farm was US\$500 million, with the Israeli government promising to cover US\$100 million over ten years, but the total expenditures on the farm have now ballooned to over US\$1.2 billion.³

Thousands of cows were imported from New Zealand to Nghệ An and equipped with electronic chips run on Afimilk's software and managed by Israeli engineers.⁴ While the farm includes 8,000 ha of land provided by the state for the production of feed, it is still dependent on the importation of soybeans and other raw materials, as each cow needs seven tonnes of feed per year.⁵

According to different sources, the project has had major impacts on local people. The construction and the operation of the farms caused serious environmental degradation and contamination, and 700 families were displaced from their lands to make way for the project.⁶ Small Vietnamese dairy farmers have also been impacted. The project emerged as Vietnam began implementing policies to facilitate corporate investment in its dairy sector, with the active encouragement of the Israeli government.⁷ Prior to 2010, dairy was completely in the hands of small-scale farmers, but by 2014, the TH Group and a few other companies held a quarter of the national herd in the mega-farms.⁸

From Vietnam, Afimilk soon expanded to other countries in Asia. In 2012, through its subsidiary Waikato, the company won a US\$500 million tender issued by the largest Chinese dairy company Mengniu to build milking parlours in China.⁹ In 2016, it was contracted by Israel's LR Group to supply equipment to a mega-dairy farm in Papua New Guinea. And just recently, in 2020, Afimilk was contracted to build a \$10 million dairy farm in Cambodia, owned by a consortium of investors from Israel, Singapore and Japan.¹⁰

Another key growth market for Israeli companies in the dairy sector is Russia. Afimilk's involvement in the country dates back to at least 2005, when it began a partnership to build dairy farms in Russia's Rostov region with AFK Sistema, a large conglomerate owned by the Russian “oligarch” Vladimir Yevtushenkov, who is currently reported to be under sanctions over Russia's war in Ukraine.¹¹ Afimilk's partner, the LR Group, signed a deal in 2013 with Russia's Ambika-Agro, a company that is a member of the Russian Israeli Business Council, to build a large dairy farm in Chechnya.¹²

Then, in June 2016, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu had a meeting where they specifically discussed cooperation in dairy-- as part of efforts to deepen political and economic ties between the two countries.¹³ This led immediately to a US\$100 million deal between the LR Group and the Russian Direct Investment Fund, a sovereign wealth fund that was sanctioned by the US and EU after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, to build dairy farms with 3,000-5,000 cows across Russia.¹⁴

It was also at this time that Afimilk's Vietnamese partner, TH Group, signed a \$2.7 billion deal with the Russian Direct Investment Fund to build a 200,000 cow dairy farm project, with Afimilk handling the construction and operations.¹⁵

LR and Mitrelli Groups in Angola

Many of the Israeli companies active in promoting turnkey agricultural projects abroad got their start in Angola. According to different sources, during the Angolan civil war in the 1990s, several former high-ranking officials from the Israeli Defence Forces and the secret service (Mossad) sold arms and defence services to both sides.¹⁶ When the war ended, they looked for other ways to profit from their high level political connections with the winning side-- the government of José Eduardo dos Santos.

Arms merchant Arcadi Gaydamak and retired Israeli army general Zeev Zacharin appear to have been the first to propose farm projects to the Dos Santos regime in 2001. They partnered with an Angolan general to build a farm outside of Luanda, contracting Green 2000 for the construction.¹⁷ Other Israeli companies involved in arm deals active in Angola, would soon follow their lead-- most notably the LR Group .

The LR Group was founded in 1985 by three former Israel Air Force pilots - Ami Lustig, Eytan Stibbe and Roy Ben-Yami. It started operating in Angola in 1991, under the direction of Haim Taib, former Israeli military officer.¹⁸ According to Ricardo Soares de Oliveira's research, the military equipment and other services that the LR Group provided to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), under the leadership of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was critical to its victory. As one Angolan official put it: "The LR Group were [practically] running the army"¹⁹. LR Group did not respond to our questions regarding this issue.

After the war, in 2003, LR Group led a project, paid for by the Angolan government, to resettle former soldiers from both sides in an agricultural village. The site for the project was in Waku Kungo, on lands where the Portuguese had failed to build a "white peasant utopia" and Bulgarian cooperation had failed with a collectivization project in the 1970s.²⁰ The 9,000 hectare project was called Aldeia Nova (New Village), in reference to the cooperative farming villages that were established in Israel in the 1950s.²¹

"Aldeia Nova was a transition from military affairs to business", said one Angolan official involved in the project. And, as with the military arrangements, the Israeli's supplied the technology and financing, and the Angolans paid for it.²²

The Aldeia Nova project was structured through Vale Fértil Limited, a subsidiary of the LR Group based in the British Virgin Islands, and the financing was organised through a US\$3 billion credit line that the LR Group provided to the Angolan state through its offshore subsidiary Luminar Finance Ltd and that was backed by the Angolan state oil company.²³ The Angolan government provided at least US\$70 million to the LR Group for the project through this financing mechanism.²⁴ LR Group did not respond to our questions regarding the financing of the project.

LR Group states that "since the beginning of the project, Aldeia Nova has brought employment, fresh food, and new hope to the region".²⁵ But other sources draw a different picture. First of all, families living on the lands were evacuated before LR Group began implementing the project on the ground, as reported by Haaretz. "The Angolans do that, not us", said Avi Shalev, a former Israel Navy officer, who was in charge of the settlement for the LR Group. "If they think that foreigners are being brought in to remove them from their homes, that could be very bad. We don't want them saying that the white man kicked them out".²⁶ Second, the families enrolled in the project started their production with a debt, as the houses, inputs and animals were provided as financial loans. If products delivered by the families do not meet the standards defined by the managers, they receive lower prices or are rejected, and many families quickly accumulate debts as a result. The production model itself, highly market-driven and based in a domestic production unit, was vertically imposed to the detriment of the traditional communal form of farming based in mutual aid.²⁷

According to Ricardo Soares de Oliveira's research, by 2008, when the LR Group pulled out of the project and handed it over to the Angolan state, the project was in deep difficulty. It was hugely reliant on Israeli managers and needed "constant injections of cash to keep running". By 2011, Aldeia Nova was bankrupt and the local families contracted by the company hadn't been paid for months.²⁸

The Angolan government then returned to the same Israeli businessmen to take back control of the project, this time handing it over to the Mitrelli Group, a company created and owned by two LR Group founders, Haim Taib and Eytan Stibbe.²⁹ Through the latter's newly formed "impact investment" private equity fund Vital Capital (registered in Switzerland and running through the British Virgin Islands), Mitrelli promised to revitalise Aldeia Nova and set up even more farms across Angola with a US\$10 million investment.³⁰ Vital Capital held 41% in the new company created to manage the project and the Angolan state the remaining 59%.³¹

An independent audit launched by the newly elected government in 2020 found that the company was suffering huge and growing losses, and that there was serious mismanagement and concerns about non-compliance with tax obligations. The audit showed that the company had not received any of the US\$10 million investment promised by Vital Capital. Worse, instead of treating Vital's US\$10 million pledge as a share purchase, the company had registered it as a loan and was paying Vital 8.75% interest on it every year. By 2019, Aldeia Nova had amassed over US\$12 million in debts due to Vital, and was paying the company US\$875,000 per year in interest (on a supposed loan that was never provided). Moreover, in the 2019 financial year, Mitrelli's various subsidiaries had charged the company over US\$1.5 million for services and supplies, not including unaccounted payments for services rendered by STB Holdings, a foreign company controlled by Eytan Stibbe and his wife (US\$443,670) and by Mitrelli's Cyprus subsidiary (US\$191,200). The auditor also warned company directors that a local Mitrelli bank account was being used to send money overseas without proper company supervision.³² The audit of 2020 accounts had similar results and highlighted doubts on the compliance with tax regulation. Mitrelli Group did not respond to our questions regarding the audit conclusions.

Jovens Lúcidos is a group of local youth who recently came together to denounce abuses committed by the Aldeia Nova company.³³ They say the average farmer supplies the company with around US\$970 to US\$1,550 worth of produce each month but only gets about US\$50 in return, usually with a delay in payment of two or even eight months. Many farming families have debts to the company, some as high as US\$11,600.³⁴ The families in the project have raised their concerns with municipal, provincial and national authorities, and they even sent a letter to the Angolan President, but until now no actions have been taken. Jovens Lúcidos is calling for workers to be given property titles for their houses and lands, and for an entirely new and different company to be created.

The displacement of local people and the poverty of the participating families might explain the issues the company has with theft on the farm. It claims to lose US\$900,000 each year from the theft of food from its fields.³⁵ To try and stop this theft, Aldeia Nova contracted the private security company Teleservice, said to be owned by Angolan generals, which uses drones and guards equipped with vehicles, dogs and weapons.³⁶ The new government seems determined to exit the project and has placed Aldeia Nova up for privatisation since August 2021.³⁷

Netafim in India

Netafim is an Israel-based provider of services and technologies for large and small scale irrigation projects, greenhouses and mining. It was established in 1965 in Kibbutz Hatzetim (Negev region in southern Israel). The company has operations in 110 countries, through 33 subsidiaries and 17 factories.³⁸ Its main markets are the US, India, Turkey, the European Union and Latin America. In 2017, the Mexican company Orbia Advance Corporation (formerly Mexichem) bought 80% of Netafim. Orbia is a publicly traded company operating in a range of sectors, such as: digital agricultural technologies, data communications infrastructure, water management systems, chemical products for automotive, infrastructure and medicine.³⁹ However, Netafim keeps headquarters in Israel, is regularly part of official delegations and is openly promoted by Israeli authorities abroad.⁴⁰ In 2020, Netafim's total sales amounted US\$972 million (15% of Orbia's revenues) and the company reported 4,000 employees.⁴¹

Netafim's involvement in the Israeli settlement system has been documented by Who Profits.⁴² The company is also one of the 150 corporations that got a warning letter from the Nations' Human Rights Commission for operating on illegal Israeli settlements.⁴³

India is an important market for Netafim. Since it first established a local subsidiary in 2001, its revenues have grown 10 times.⁴⁴ In 2010, Igal Aisenberg, President and CEO of Netafim, claimed that they have penetrated in almost all of the country's local markets with an average market-share of 20%. By 2020, Netafim had irrigation projects in 202 villages across India, reaching over 97,000 farmers on 106,000 hectares, with a value, according to the company, of US\$245 million.⁴⁵ Netafim hopes that its revenues will grow even further under the central government's plan to bring in 2 million hectares under drip and sprinkler irrigation within five years.⁴⁶

Netafim's first major venture in India was in Kuppam, in the southern state of Telangana (formerly Andhra Pradesh) for a model contract farming project using drip irrigation to grow crops such as potatoes, gherkins, groundnut in the early 2000s. A study of this project stated that in order to consolidate land for the

project, local farmers were displaced. Israeli technology was considered economically unviable without large state's subsidies and the full project, which included the use of chemical fertilisers and inputs, was qualified as socially and environmentally unsustainable.⁴⁷ Another study found that Indian farmers did not benefit from Netafim's irrigation model in the 2017 Ramthal project in Karnataka, which covered tens of thousands of acres, involving 15,000 farmers in 30 villages. In concrete, the investigation reported that farmers had to pay a very high cost for drip lines maintenance once the model was imposed on their lands.⁴⁸ In 2019, Netafim was contracted to develop four similar large-scale projects in Karnataka and Telangana in over 100 villages and involving 60,000 farmers. This time, the technology developed by mPrest, a subsidiary of the Israeli state-owned military corporation Rafael Advanced Defence Systems was adapted to civilian use.⁴⁹ As mentioned previously, the same software has been used by the Israeli military in attacks on Gaza in 2014.

In 2020, a group of Indian farmers took Netafim's financing division to court. They claim that Netafim Agricultural Financing Agency (NAFA) failed to install irrigation technologies and provide one-year agronomy support as promised.⁵⁰

Tahal Group (Kardan N.V.) in Angola

Tahal is a water engineering company established in 1952 by Israel and active in Israel, the occupied territories of Palestine and overseas.⁵¹ In 1992, it was put up for privatisation and acquired by a group of Israeli investors, led by a real estate company called Kardan Israel. Both Kardan and Tahal were later incorporated in the Netherlands, and, in 2001, Tahal became a full subsidiary of Kardan N.V., a company now publicly traded on the Euronext Amsterdam and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.⁵²

According to Who Profits, Tahal has been contracted on several occasions in recent years to build water infrastructure in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. It has also been included in the UN list of corporations and banks supporting the illegal settlement enterprise.⁵³

Tahal has been involved in several agriculture irrigation projects, including a 20,000 hectare project in the Lake Tana area of Ethiopia and a 15,310 hectare project in southern Kazakhstan that is part of a larger irrigation scheme financed by the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵⁴ The Government of Botswana contracted Tahal to draft a 10-year National Master Plan for Arable Agriculture and Dairy Development (NAMPAAADD) in the 1990s, after which Tahal put forward a US\$750 million, 40,000 hectare "commercial farming proposal" in 2005, called the Zambezi Integrated Agro-Commercial Development Project. The Botswana Cabinet approved the project in 2006 and contracted Tahal to "facilitate negotiations" for its development. However, the corporation was unable to secure financing and the project was not implemented.⁵⁵

Tahal's most significant agribusiness activities have been in Angola through a partnership with a company called ZRB Consulting Finance & Development Limited. ZRB is majority owned by Zeev Zacharin, a retired Israeli general who is well known for his involvement in diamond trading and private military companies in Africa.⁵⁶ Zacharin was a close business partner of the Israeli arms dealer Arcadi Gaydamak, and worked closely with him on his initial activities in Angola in the 1990s, including the Angolagate arms scandal, in which arms sales for US\$790 million were sold to Angolan President Dos Santos in defiance of a U.N. arms embargo. In this case, Gaydamak was convicted in 2009 by a Paris court of illegal arms deals, tax fraud, and money laundering.⁵⁷ He was acquitted in 2015 on illegal arms trading charges but convicted of tax violations and money laundering, and sentenced to three years in prison.⁵⁸ Zacharin's ties with Kardan appear to date back to Kardan's initial business in the diamond trade. In the 1990s, Zacharin headed a private military company, Levdan, subsidiary of Kardan Investment, which is reported to have arranged a US\$50 million arms and security deal in the Congo.⁵⁹ Soon after, he followed Gaydamak into Angola, where he had become a central player in trafficking arms and providing military security. Kardan N.V. did not respond to our questions regarding the relationship between the company and Kardan Investment or Levdan.

In 2001, Zacharin and Gaydamak began the construction of a five-hectare farm outside of the Angolan capital Luanda. The farm project, known as Terra Verde, is said to have been financed by Gaydamak, but also had the Angolan general, Fernando Araújo, as a part owner.⁶⁰ The Israeli company, Green 2000 Ltd, was brought in to construct and manage the Terra Verde project.⁶¹

There is little public information about Zacharin's activities in Angola until about 10 years later, in 2016, when he and others from the Terra Verde project formed ZRB and began a partnership with Tahal to handle the management of a large-scale farm in Quiminha, on the banks of the Bengo River, that Tahal had been contracted to build in 2011.

After a few years of fund raising, Tahal's Quiminha Integrated Agricultural and Regional Development Project managed to gather a staggering US\$200 million, through loans by the Dutch Bank ING, Bank Hapoalim and Bank Leumi to the Angolan government, and with guarantees provided by the export credit agencies of the Netherlands (Atradius), Israel (Ashra) and Italy (Sace).⁶² Once the financing was secured, Tahal and the government began relocating farming communities from an area of 5,000 hectares to make way for Tahal to construct 310 new farms of 5 hectares each for "private national or foreign investors". By 2014, Tahal claimed to have relocated 1,000 families from the project area. An investigation by Maka Angola found that the project was part of a large system of land grabbing in the area, where peasants were displaced by government officials without compensation. "They expropriated the land from the peasants, with promises of compensation that they never kept," said one local resident, speaking specifically about Tahal.⁶³

At the end of the seven-year contract for the construction of the project, in 2017, Tahal handed the operations of the farms to the Government of Angola. But then the two sides immediately signed a new seven-year contract under which Tahal, through a joint venture with ZRB, would handle the management and operations. The contract entitled Tahal and ZRB to all of the proceeds from the sales of the settlement's agricultural output.⁶⁴

That same year, Tahal and ZRB signed another four agreements worth a total of US\$291 million with the state-owned company Gesterra - Gestão de Terras Aráveis to build four more large-scale agriculture projects in the Cabinda, Huambo, Kwanza Sul and Lunda Sul provinces.⁶⁵ Kardan N.V. did not respond to our questions regarding the current status of these projects.

The Quiminha project, meanwhile, is in bad shape. Tahal dropped out in 2020.⁶⁶ Journalists visiting the site in 2022 reported that 600 workers had recently been fired, and the remaining workers had not been paid for months. Several of the houses initially intended for farmers were instead being inhabited by local elites as vacation homes. Crops were only being cultivated on two or three of the sixty, 50 hectare farms within the project site, as there was a severe lack of water for irrigation. It was also reported that infrastructure was degrading due to lack of use. The journalists also found serious corruption and mismanagement issues in their investigations, which were denied by the Angolan company managing currently the project.⁶⁷

Notes

1. See: <https://www.whoprofits.org/company/afimilk-agricultural-cooperative/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
2. According to the TH Group, the farms cover currently 37,000 hectares (<https://www.thmilk.vn/en/th-farm/>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
3. See: Vietnam Investment Review, “Thai Huong listed among top 50 Asian women with international influence”, 14 January 2022, <https://vir.com.vn/thai-huong-listed-among-top-50-asian-women-with-international-influence-90709.html>; “The Revalter project Multiscale assessment of the livestock development pathways in Vietnam The TH milk company (Vietnam). Is such a large-scale investment sustainable?”, CIRAD, RUDEC, October 2015, <https://agritrop.cirad.fr/579403/1/Report%20visit%20to%20TH%20omega-farm%20VF2.pdf>; and <https://www.thmilk.vn/en/th-farm/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
4. Nguyen Mai Huong et.al., “Dairy farming, a clash of production models”, in: Atlas of livestock transitions in Vietnam 1986 – 2016, IPSARD, CIRAD, Chapter 5, 2019, https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/2022-05/010083453.pdf [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
5. Nguyen Mai Huong et.al., “Dairy farming, a clash of production models”, in: Atlas of livestock transitions in Vietnam 1986 – 2016, IPSARD, CIRAD, Chapter 5, 2019, https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/2022-05/010083453.pdf [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
6. See: Land Matrix (<https://landmatrix.org/deal/3368/#general>); and “The Revalter project Multiscale assessment of the livestock development pathways in Vietnam The TH milk company (Vietnam). Is such a large-scale investment sustainable?”, CIRAD, RUDEC, October 2015, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220305104643/https://agritrop.cirad.fr/579403/1/Report%20visit%20to%20TH%20mega-farm%20VF2.pdf>; . In 2020, the media outlet [Moitruong.net.vn](http://moitruong.net.vn) sent a team of journalists to the area. They reported that local people were still complaining about the pollution caused by the project to the Peoples’ Committee of Nghe An province and local authorities, to the point of demanding to be relocated. Doubts were also raised about the extent to which TH Group was complying with the planned compensation plan (<https://moitruong.net.vn/nghia-dan-nghe-an-bai-5-trang-trai-bo-sua-th-true-milk-gay-o-nhiem-nang-ne-nguoi-dan-xom-dong-lam-tiep-tuc-keu-cuu-5202.html>). In June 2022, the local authorities reassessed the need to allocate more funds for the compensation of those affected and their resettlement (<https://doanhnghieptiepthi.vn/nghe-an-chu-tich-ubnd-tinh-lam-viec-voi-lanh-dao-huyen-nghia-dan-161220618111802952.htm>) [Last visit: 11 October 2022].
7. GRAIN, “The corporate attack on Pakistan’s small dairies”, 29 September 2021, <https://grain.org/en/article/6738-the-corporate-attack-on-pakistan-s-small-dairies>; Avigayil Kadesh, “Israel and Vietnam plan R&D fund, free trade”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2014: <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/innovativeisrael/agriculture/pages/israel-and-vietnam-plan-rd-fund-free-trade-15-june-2014.aspx>; and Abigail Klein Leichman, “Milking Israel’s dairy expertise in Vietnam”, Israel12c, 7 February 2011: <https://www.israel12c.org/milking-israels-dairy-expertise-in-vietnam/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
8. Nguyen Mai Huong et.al., “Dairy farming, a clash of production models”, in: Atlas of livestock transitions in Vietnam 1986 – 2016, IPSARD, CIRAD, Chapter 5, 2019, https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/2022-05/010083453.pdf [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
9. See: <http://www.fccapital.com/afimilk-wins-500-million-contract-chinese-dairies/>. In 2014, Afimilk partnered with TIAN Nian G to build another dairy project in Ningxia province (<https://youtu.be/OEuOry-qqZo>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
10. See: <https://southeastasiaglobe.com/the-future-of-cambodias-agriculture/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
11. “Russian billionaire Yevtushenkov cedes control of Sistema after UK sanctions”, Reuters, 13 April 2022: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-sistema-idUKKCN2M51LS>. For information on the AFK-Afimilk farms, see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGeDDUg2BSY> and IA Bursa et al., “Using The Integration Processes To Improve The Efficiency Of Agricultural Production,” Research Journal of Pharmaceutical, Biological and Chemical Sciences, Jan-Feb 2019, p. 3: [https://www.ripcbs.com/pdf/2019_10\(1\)/\[199\].pdf](https://www.ripcbs.com/pdf/2019_10(1)/[199].pdf) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
12. “Israel’s company to build dairy commercial farm in Chechnya,” TASS, December 2013: <https://tass.com/economy/710881>; Alexei Kuzmenko, “Black Earth founder invests in dairy cows in Chechnya,” Russia Beyond, October 2013: https://www.rbth.com/business/2013/10/15/black-earth-founder-invests-in-dairy-cows-in-chechnya_30801.html; “Russia and Israel in the Changing Middle East,” Conference Proceedings Institute for National Security Studies, 2013: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep08970.13.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
13. “Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu to discuss dairy farming development in Russia,” DairyNews, JUNE 2016: <https://dairynews.today/news/vladimir-putin-and-benjamin-netanyahu-to-discuss-d.html> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
14. “Russia, Israeli firm agree to invest \$100 mln in Russia’s dairy industry,” Reuters, March 2017: <https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-dairy-investment-idUKL5N1GM51D>. When Israel’s Minister of Environment, Zeev Elkin was questioned about why he was personally promoting the project, his spokesman told Haaretz that Elkin was involved in his role as Israeli chairman of the Joint Israel-Russian

- Economic Committee and that “the dairy project is a flagship project that the president of Russia and prime minister of Israel agreed on two years ago.” (see: Shuki Sadeh, “Israel Eyes Russian Dairy Project With Fund Under Western Sanctions,” Haaretz, April 2018: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2018-04-02/ty-article/israel-eyes-russian-dairy-project-with-fund-under-western-sanctions/0000017f-e21d-d568-ad7f-f37f3f980000>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
15. “RDIF makes giant investment into TH Group’s Russian milk projects,” Vietnam Investment Review, May 2018: <https://vir.com.vn/rdif-makes-giant-investment-into-th-groups-russian-milk-projects-59461.html> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
16. See: Shuki Sadeh, “Inside the Shadowy World of Israeli Arms Dealers”, Haaretz, 11 January 2020, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-inside-the-shadowy-world-of-israeli-arms-dealers-1.8379032>; Gur Megiddo, “The Israeli fighter pilots who got rich off Angola’s civil war and their link to a Massive Cyberattack”, Haaretz, 1 January 2019, <https://twitter.com/haaretzcom/status/1079722354622656514>, <https://www.strategicstudyindia.com/2019/01/the-israeli-fighter-pilots-who-got-rich.html?m=0> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]; and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
17. For more information and sources on this case, see the company profile in this annex.
18. See also: Rui Verde, “Words and actions: a realistic enquiry into digital surveillance in contemporary Angola”, Media Policy and Democracy Project, 2021, https://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/report_03_2021_words_and_actions_angola_masterset.pdf; “Israeli involvement in electronic surveillance in Angola: a step towards transparency or the sophistication of illegal practices?”, Media Policy and Democracy Project, 2021, https://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/angola_report.pdf [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
19. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
20. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
21. Agrotec, “Angola quer voltar a ser uma potência agrícola mais ainda há obstáculos”, 15 July 2013, <http://www.agrotec.pt/noticias/angola-quer-voltar-a-ser-uma-potencia-agricola-mais-ainda-ha-obstaculos/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
22. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
23. See: London Stock Exchange Group, “The Republic of Angola. US\$500,000,000 9.375 per cent. Notes due 2048”, 7 July 2018, https://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/9480U_1-2018-7-17.pdf; Diário de Notícias “Contas do Governo angolano colocam 8% da dívida pública nas mãos de Israel”, 6 June 2018, <https://www.dn.pt/lusa/contas-do-governo-angolano-colocam-8-da-divida-publica-nas-maos-de-israel-9415371.html> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]; and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
24. According to Africa Intelligence, Luminar’s usual procedure is to offer loans backed by mining or oil production, under the condition of contracting the LR and/or the Mitrelli Groups. Since the 1990s, Luminar loaned to the Angolan government near US\$3 billion, “most of which was repaid in crude oil”. Before being linked to agricultural projects as Aldeia Nova, the contracts were related to surveillance and military equipment (“Luminar, the tiny bank which lends to presidents...but only if they sign contracts with Mitrelli”, 8 July 2020, https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-and-west-africa_business/2020/07/08/luminar-the-tiny-bank-which-lends-to-presidentsbut-only-if-they-sign-contracts-with-mitrelli,109243081-art [Last visit: 30 August 2022]).
25. LR Group, “Adama Aldeia Nova, Angola”, n.d., <https://lr-group.com/project/adama-aldeia-nova-angola-2/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
26. Yotam Feldman, “High Times in Angola”, Haaretz, 4 January 2009, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5057354> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
27. Garcia Neves Quitari, “Agricultura familiar em Angola: as armadilhas conceituais da classificação dicotómica”, *Mulemba*, 5(10), 2015 (233-260), <https://doi.org/10.4000/mulemba.2010> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
28. Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land. Angola Since the Civil War*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2015.
29. “Luminar, the tiny bank which lends to presidents...but only if they sign contracts with Mitrelli”, Africa Intelligence, 8 July 2020, https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-and-west-africa_business/2020/07/08/luminar-the-tiny-bank-which-lends-to-presidents-but-only-if-they-sign-contracts-with-mitrelli,109243081-art [Last visit: 30 August 2022]. Eytan Stibbe left the Mitrelli Group in 2019.
30. Vital Capital is also an investor in Bob Geldof’s 8 Miles private equity fund, which raised in 2020 US\$150 million to invest in African companies across eight countries (see: <https://frontera.net/news/want-change-world-ten-frontier-investors-making-biggest-impact/> and <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/inside-track-bob-geldofs-private-equity-fund-8-miles-eyes-ugandan-bank-exit-sxpf58lpz>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
31. See the Aldeia Nova 2020 financial audit done by Advisors, in: “Aldeia Nova. Relatório de Direcção. Exercício 2020”, April 2021, <http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/ndkx/-edisp/minfin1491822.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
32. According to the audit: “During the 2019 financial year, the Company recorded costs arising from the following. (i) STB Holdings in the amount of Kz 228,240,000 without any documentary support and without the respective contract approved by Aldeia Nova’s Board of Directors and from (ii) Mitrelli Group Ltd. (Cyprus) in the amount of Kz 98,366,880 referring to the Mitrelli Group’s administrative and insurance costs, which were not approved by the Board of Directors” (see the Aldeia Nova 2019 financial audit done by Advisors, in:

- A“Aldeia Nova Waco Cungo, S.A. Relatório de control interno para o exercício findo em 31 dezembro de 2019”, 2019, <http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/mjiw/~edisp/minfin1220754.pdf> and Sahara Reporters, “DOSSIER: Owned By Amaechi’s Friend — Everything You Need To Know About HSLI, The Israeli Company Hired To Jam The Networks During Elections”, 14 February 2019, <http://saharareporters.com/2019/02/14/dossier-owned-amaechis-friend-%E2%80%94-everything-you-need-know-about-hsli-israeli-company-hired/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
33. Radio Angola, “ONG denuncia “escravatura moderna” de trabalhadores pelo “Projecto Aldeia Nova” no Waku Kungo”, 20 December 2020, <https://radioangola.org/ong-denuncia-escravatura-moderna-de-trabalhadores-pelo-projecto-aldeia-nova-no-waku-kungo/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
34. According to Aldeia Nova, farmers owe in total US1.4 million to the company (Aldeia Nova, “Relatório de direcção. Exercício 2020”, 2020, <http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/ndkx/~edisp/minfin1491822.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]).
35. “Aldeia Nova. Relatório de Direcção. Exercício 2020”, April 2021, <http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/aw4x/ndkx/~edisp/minfin1491822.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
36. Angop, “Aldeia Nova monitora produção agrícola com drones”, 9 February 2022, <https://www.angop.ao/noticias/economia/aldeia-nova-monitora-producao-agricola-com-recurso-a-tecnologia/>. For more on Teleservice, see: Rafael Marques, “Harvesting hunger in Angola’s diamond fields”, 2008, <https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/files/reports-and-materials/Marques-Harvesting-Hunger-Angola-Diamond-Fields-Jul-2008.pdf>. See also: <https://freespeechdebate.com/discuss/rafael-marques-and-defamation-law-in-angola/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]. Marques is an Angolan journalist and human rights activist who’s research led him to be denounced for defamation and to risk years of imprisonment.
37. Angop, “Finanças registam incumprimentos na liquidação dos activos vendidos”, 17 August 2021, <https://www.angop.ao/noticias/economia/financas-registam-incumprimentos-na-liquidacao-dos-activos-vendidos/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
38. Netafim’s major subsidiaries are: Eden Irrigation, Hortifim B.V., Kassen-Verwarmingsindustrie Gakon B.V., MMXI Netafim Irrigation, Inc., Netafim Agricultural Financing Agency Private Limited, Netafim Australia Pty Limited, Netafim France SAS, Netafim Irrigation India Pvt Ltd., Netafim Mexico, S.A. De C.V., Netafim Peru, S.A.C, Regulación y manejo de fluidos, S.A., and Revaho BV (source: Capital IQ) [Last visit: 1 June 2022].
39. Kibbutz Hatzerim has kept 20% of Netafim. Orbia is mainly controlled by Grupo Empresarial Kaluz S.A. de C.V., headquartered in Mexico. The subsidiaries of Kaluz are dedicated to financial services, building materials and the petrochemical industry. Kaluz is owned by the family del Valle Perochena, the main promoters of the Mexican Business Council (CMN), known as the “cupola of cupolas” of the private sector because it brings together Mexico’s richest and most powerful businessmen (see: <https://www.proceso.com.mx/reports/2020/11/9/los-padrinos-de-claudio-x-gonzalez-252392.html>). Francisco Javier del Valle Perochena, member of Orbia’s board, appears to be linked to offshore financial structures, according to the Pandora Papers (see: <https://theguadalajarapost.com/2021/10/04/over-3000-mexican-elite-politicians-and-criminals-exposed-in-pandora-papers-video/>). The del Valle family is the main shareholder of Grupo Pochecha, a company that has been since 2021 under the scrutiny of the Mexican Financial Intelligence Unity (UIF) and the US Drug Enforcement Administration for its alleged role in the importation of precursor chemicals for drug manufacture (see: <https://www.axisnegocios.com/breves.phtml?id=105534>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
40. For example, Netafim is in the 2021 catalogue of the Israeli Business Delegation to Romania (see: Israel Export Institute, “Israeli Business Delegation to Romania”, June 2021: https://www.export.gov.il/api/Media/Default/Files/Delegations/delegations_Romania_delegation_june21.pdf) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
41. Orbia, 2020 Sustainability report: <https://www.netafim.com/es-pe/bynder/262D5F20-A3D9-4A4F-BFA05E4FF07877FA-reporte-de-sustentabilidad---2020.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
42. Who Profits, “Netafim: from facilitator of occupation to global leader in sustainable agriculture”, March 2020, <https://www.whoprofits.org/updates/netafim-from-facilitator-of-occupation-to-global-leader-in-sustainable-agriculture/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
43. Barak Ravid, “UN Sent Warning Letter to 150 Companies for Doing Business in Israeli Settlements”, Haaretz, 28 September 2017, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/un-warned-150-companies-for-doing-business-in-settlements-1.5453996> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]. According to Michael Lynk, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, Israeli settlements amount to a war crime (see: “Israeli Settlements Amount to a War Crime, Special Rapporteur Tells Human Rights Council”, United Nations, 9 July 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/07/israeli-settlements-amount-war-crime-special-rapporteur-tells-human-rights>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
44. R.N. Bhaskar, “Israel’s micro-irrigation king seeks crown in India”, DNA, 2010, <https://www.dnaindia.com/business/interview-israel-s-micro-irrigation-king-seeks-crown-in-india-1411575> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
45. See: Bismah Malik, “Israel-based irrigation firm, Netafim secures USD 85 million deal to execute three new projects in Karnataka”, The Indian Express, 12 August 2020, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2020/aug/12/>

[israel-based-irrigation-firm-netafim-secures-usd-85-million-deal-to-execute-three-new-projects-in-k-2182534.html](#); and Orbia, “2020 Sustainability report”, 2020, <https://www.netafim.com/es-pe/bynder/262D5F20-A3D9-4A4F-BFA05E4FF07877FA-reporte-de-sus-tentabilidad---2020.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022]. In 2019, Netafim was contracted to build US\$100 million value irrigation projects in Karnataka and Telangana. The technology involved includes the irrigation platform NetBeat™.

46. Madhvi Sally, “Budget gives push to micro-irrigation sector”, The Economic Times, 1 February 2021, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/budget-gives-push-to-micro-irrigation-sector/articleshow/80628252.cms?from=mdr> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

47. Andhra Pradesh Coalition in Defence of Diversity, “Contract farming: Burden on exchequer. Kuppam’s failed experiment points out better options toward state supported agriculture”, July 2002, <https://indiatogether.org/agriculture/dds/contractfarming.htm>, quoted by BDS India, “Netafim in India: greenwashing apartheid. Brief study of Netafim’s operations in Pollachi, Tamil Nadu”, November 2020, <https://bdsmovement.net/resources/netafim-sustaining-israeli-settlements-greenwashing-apartheid-and-selling-unsustainable> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

48. See: BDS India, “Netafim in India: greenwashing apartheid. Brief study of Netafim’s operations in Pollachi, Tamil Nadu”, November 2020, <https://bdsmovement.net/resources/netafim-sustaining-israeli-settlements-greenwashing-apartheid-and-selling-unsustainable>; and Vivian Fernandes, “Karnataka’s largest tech-induced irrigation project in muddy waters?”, The Federal, 23 June 2021, <https://thefederal.com/states/south/karnataka/rainfed-or-tech-induced-irrigation-farmers-caught-in-muddy-waters/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

49. Yuval Azulai, “Netafim wins \$100m Indian project”, Globes, 11 March 2019, <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-netafim-wins-100m-indian-project-1001277460> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

50. Venky Ramachandran, “Netafim India’s Beer Game Problems”, Agribusiness Matters, 8 August 2020, <https://agribusinessmatters.substack.com/p/netafim-indias-beer-game-problems?s=r> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

51. See: [https://www.whoprofits.org/company/tahal-group-international/#:~:text=Tahal%20Group%20International%20is%2098.43,Aviv%20Stock%20Exchange%20\(KRNV\)](https://www.whoprofits.org/company/tahal-group-international/#:~:text=Tahal%20Group%20International%20is%2098.43,Aviv%20Stock%20Exchange%20(KRNV)) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

52. See: http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/17/170444/lawFilings/getfile11.pdf [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

53. See: <https://www.whoprofits.org/company/tahal-group-international/>; and United Nations, “Database of all business enterprises involved in the activities detailed in paragraph 96 of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (A/HRC/43/71)”, February 2020, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3872338?ln=es> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

54. For Kazakhstan see: <https://www.facebook.com/Tahalgroupposts/1317049418457795/>; <https://www.water-technology.net/news/news-kazakhstan-to-receive-water-use-loan-from-the-ibrd-4257050/>; <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/917891468272048966/pdf>; <https://finchannel.com/world-bank-to-help-kazakhstan-modernize-irrigation-system/>. On the Ethiopian project, see: <https://terraverde-ag.com/projects/irrigation-and-drainage-ethiopia/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

55. See: Botswana Ministry of Agriculture, “National Agricultural Master Plan for Arable Agriculture and Dairy Development”, June 2014, <https://landmatrix.org/media/uploads/moagovbwnavhubprojects.pdf>; Wellington R.L. Masamba, “Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the Botswana Portion of the Okavango River Basin”, OKACOM, July 2009, <https://iwlearn.net/resolveuid/a6a32ba3e-a9cd1740d7870e914e96991>; “Financiers shun multibillion Zambezi Agro-processing project?”, Sunday Standard, 2 March 2020, <https://www.sundaystandard.info/financiers-shun-multibillion-zambezi-agro-processing-project/>; and <https://www.facebook.com/BotswanaGovernment/photos/a.336021353147196/1601660716583247/?type=3>. The Zambezi Integrated Agro-Commercial Development Project finally received a grant from the African Development Bank in March 2022 (see: <https://www.developmentaid.org/tenders/view/937351/zambezi-integrated-agro-commercial-development-project-general-procurement-notice>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

56. See: <https://cyprusregistry.com/companies/HE/209696>. Zacharin was also reportedly the Israeli Chief of Staff’s Bureau Chief in Lebanon in 1982 during the ‘Beirut Massacre’ (see: <https://cdn2.globalwitness.org/archive/files/pdfs/a%20crude%20awakening.pdf>; and <https://turiesdubrabant.1fr1.net/t1202p15-van-camp-catherine>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

57. See: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 11ème chambre - 3ème section, “Jugement N° 0019292016”, 27 October 2009, https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/Docs/NLP/France/Angolagate_Judgment_27-10-2009.pdf.

58. Chen Ma’anit, “Arcadi Gaydamak begins prison term in France”, Globes, 24 November 2015, <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-arcadi-gaydamak-begins-prison-term-in-france-1001083454> [Last visit: 7 October 2022]. Recently, Zeev Zacharin was indicted in proceedings in Luxembourg for having made fake board meeting minutes that are alleged to have enabled Gaydamak’s asset managers to embezzle money, US\$7.4 million (€7 million) of which is said to have been deposited in Zacharin’s personal bank account (see: <https://www.intelligenceonline.com/corporate-intelligence/2021/08/25/zeev-zacharin-still-sought-in-luxembourg-over-gaydamak-s-missing-millions109686932-eve>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].

59. See: "Congo pays \$50 million for Israeli military trainers", UPI, 9 February 2014, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/02/09/Congo-pays-50-million-for-Israeli-military-trainers/5859760770000/>; Gabriella Pagliani, *Il mestiere della guerra: dai mercenari ai manager della sicurezza*, Franco Angeli, 2004 p.85, <https://books.google.ca/books?id=0bfTjoMQrsMC&printsec=frontcover>; Greg Mills and John Stremlau, *The Privatisation of Security in Africa*, SAIIA, March 1999, https://www.africaportal.org/documents/1264/Privatisation_of_security_in_Africa.pdf; and https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Levdan,_Ltd. [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
60. See: "Dos Santos prestes a reabilitar general corrupto", *Maka Angola*, 8 April 2014, <https://www.makaangola.org/2014/04/dos-santos-prestes-a-reabilitar-general-corrupto/>, and Rafael Marques de Morais, "Gaydamak, Mossad e o poder de Dos Santos", *Maka Angola*, 8 September 2012, <https://www.makaangola.org/2012/09/gaydamak-mossad-e-o-poder-de-dos-santos/>. The owners of Terra Verde Empreendimentos Agrícolas SARL are: COPINOL SARL (80%), a BVI company called Pusan Finance Limitada (15%), Fernando Alberto Vasquez Araújo(4%), and Alberto Serafim Ferreira Vasquez Araújo (0.5%). COPINOL is reported to be owned by Gaydamak and Zacharin (Rafael marques de Morais, op.cit). In court proceedings, Gaydamak admitted that Pusan received funds from the Israeli diamond magnate Lev Leviev for Gaydamak's 50% interest in Angolan diamond mine venture they had. Both Gaydamak and Araújo made millions through the Angolagate scandal (see <https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff7e360d03e7f57eb2a33> and Rafael Marques de Morais, op.cit). See also: "Organic Growth", *Sonangol Universo*, Autumn 2004, p. 20: <https://tinyurl.com/3y2rrf97>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
61. Joe Charlaff, "Israeli agricultural know-how helps Angola grow their own," *Israel 21c*, May 2006, <https://www.israel21c.org/israeli-agricultural-know-how-helps-angola-grow-their-own/>
62. See: Agrix, "Dutch agrifood private sector involvement in Angola. Developing Angolan-Dutch private sector cooperation", January 2015, <http://businessdocbox.com/Agriculture/72946963-Final-draft-not-intended-for-distribution.html>; and Yonatan Kitain, "TAHAL builds infrastructure for Angolan farming project", *Globes*, 27 October 2014, <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-tahal-builds-infrastructure-for-angolan-farming-project-1000981518>. Before joining Tahal in 2001, Lipkin-Shahak, was a member of the Israeli Knesset and a high-level officer in the IDF- Head of Intelligence from 1986 to 1991, Deputy Chief of Staff from 1991-1995, and Chief of Staff from 1995-1998 (see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amnon_Lipkin-Shahak). He is also said to be a "friend and business partner" of Arcadi Gaydamak (see: https://thirdworldtraveler.com/Weapons/Influence_Peddlers_MAK.html) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
63. The government claimed to have compensated 652 farmers who were displaced by the project. See: <https://www.makaangola.org/2014/11/general-governador-toma-de-assalto-terras-do-kwanza-sul/> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
64. "What Tahal's \$370M project means for Angola's agriculture development", *Caterpillar Technicians for Africa*, 10 July 2017, <https://techniciansforafrica.caterpillaruniversity.com/what-tahals-370m-project-means-for-angolas-agriculture-development/> [Last visit: 26 August 2022].
65. See: <https://www.tahal.com/tahal-group-together-partner-zrb-company-will-carry-three-agricultural-projects-angola-total-value-nis-1-billion/> and <https://www.kardan.nl/images/annual-report/annual-reports-barnea/BARNEA-2019-FINAL.pdf>. They also signed a separate US\$176 million agreement that year with the Government of Zambia to build an agricultural village project, called AgroLuswishi, on 7,782 hectares. But Tahal and ZRB were unable to close on a financing deal with a foreign bank for these additional Angola projects, and the Zambian project appears to have stalled as well (see: <https://tinyurl.com/33jyke8x>) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
66. Kardan N.V. "Annual Report 2020", <https://www.kardan.nl/images/annual-report/annual-reports/Kardan-Annual-Report-2020.pdf> [Last visit: 30 August 2022].
67. Hortênsio Sebastiao, "Quiminha: Objectivo para o qual foi criado está longe de ser alcançado", 18 February 2022, <https://novojournal.co.ao/economia/interior/quiminha-objectivo-para-o-qual-foi-criado-esta-longe-de-ser-alcancado-106884.html> (PDF version) [Last visit: 30 August 2022].