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Having reached the ripe old age of 7 years, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) seems to have entered its
adult life. In late May, the CBD held its fifth Conference of the
Parties (COP5) in Nairobi, Kenya. This COP had a markedly different
character from the earlier four. The heated political conflicts,
in particular North-South, which used to dominate, were much less
consuming. This is not to say that conflicts have disappeared or
been resolved. It is rather that after a number of years, delegations
are so well aware of each others’ positions that they can anticipate
what reactions to expect, and largely adapt their tactics to the
maneuvering space they think they have. This can be confusing to
the casual observer, as more and more of the political discussion
takes place between the lines of the decision texts.
What is also obvious is that the CBD is moving
into the huge challenges of the implementation phase. In its attempts
to translate lofty principles into practical action, the COP has
been transformed into a huge department store of biodiversity policies.
The Nairobi meeting adopted 30 different decisions on a wide variety
of issues including alien invasive species, ecotourism, the Global
Strategy for Plant Conservation, the ecosystem approach, monitoring
and assessment, indicators, and sustainable use. One consequence
of this shift is that technical experts are proliferating. Total
participation at COP5 ran to more than 1,500 (the participant list
was almost 170 pages long), many of which were specialists in one
narrow field of biodiversity.
With the emphasis moving from the political to
the technical, Southern delegations tend to be at a disadvantage.
Few can match the North in technical expertise and financial constraints
prevent them from sending the 10-20 person delegations typically
presented by developed countries. The net effect, perhaps compounded
by political and/or economic crises in several key countries in
the South, was a lower level of input from their side.
The access and benefit sharing (ABS) provision
was expected to be most controversial at COP5. The technical expert
panel set up by COP4 (held in Costa Rica in 1999) did not have a
formal mandate to continue, so the main question was whether or
not to prolong its mandate. In the end, it was decided that the
expert panel would meet one more time prior to the establishment
of an open-ended working group open to all Parties and observers,
in line with normal CBD rules of procedure.
It was generally expected that the South would
press for clear language on inclusion of its traditional concerns
in the ABS group’s mandate, such as the relation between ABS
and IPRs, protection of traditional knowledge, and the status of
ex situ collections. Yet other delegations, notably the EU,
were more active in pushing for their inclusion. As it stands, the
mandate was left very open, giving the working group freedom to
discuss those aspects of ABS it judges most relevant.
In the agrobiodiversity field, COP5 addressed two
new issues, the decline of pollinators and the introduction of GURTs
(Genetic Use Restriction Technologies), better known as “Terminator”
and “Traitor” technologies. GURTs are controversial,
and the text proposed in 1999 was subject to long and tricky negotiations.
It recommends in relatively strong wording that Parties should at
present neither field test nor market those technologies. It was
expected that both proponents and opponents of the technologies
would try to achieve changes to the text, but these did not materialise.
But language was added to the effect that GURTs will now be considered
under each element of the work programme and a report on the issue
will be given to COP6.
Both the agrobiodiversity decision and the access
decision also include identical language urging the FAO to complete
the renegotiation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources (IU). The issue of the formal relationship between the
IU and the CBD was not directly addressed. It is not clear that
there will be support to make it a protocol to the CBD, and even
if there is, this may not even be possible given the formal intricacies
of co-ownership between two independent UN bodies.
Article 8(j) issues, on the rights of indigenous
people and local communities, were mainly dealt with in a separate
contact group. Here much of the anticipated political conflict also
failed to materialise. In fact, in their final statement, the indigenous
peoples present expressed their satisfaction with the work of the
COP5, in particular because their opportunities for participation
in the discussions had radically improved. It is clear that the
intersessional process which has developed since 1997 has strenghthened
the position of the indigenous representatives, although –
as they also noted – basic differences of opinion regarding
in particular IPRs have not changed.
The whole high-level segment was devoted to the
biosafety protocol. Not very many ministers were present (Nairobi
is a long way to go to read a speech and write your name), but there
was definitely a sense of pride and historic achievement in the
air as ambassadors made their statements. No doubt the successful
conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol (see Seedling,
March 2000, p2) was another factor behind the relative absence
of open political controversy at COP5. A total of 68 countries signed
the protocol in Nairobi, including Argentina and Chile, member of
the so-called "Miami Group" that had resisted it
so strongly.
In a separate plenary discussion on the work programme
of the ICCP (Intergovernmental Committee on the Cartagena Protocol,
the body which will meet to prepare the implementation before it
is formally in force), Argentina however made a renewed attempt
at obstructing the work, proposing that the mandate of the group
should be severely limited. But there was virtually no support,
and in fact Canada, one of Argentina’s Miami Group partners,
openly dissociated itself from the proposal.
From GRAIN sources at the CBD’s COP5, Nairobi.
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