">
Bt Cotton and Small-scale
Farmers in
Makhathini
- A Story of Debt,
Dependency, and Dicey
Economics
By Elfrieda
Pschorn-Strauss, Biowatch South Africa[1]*<
/h2>
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
South Africa is the only country
in Africa growing GM crops commercially. To our knowledge,
it is the first place in the world where small-scale
farmers have been introduced to GM crops. On 26 March 2002
the Indian government approved the growing of GE cotton and
this will most likely lead to more small-scale farmers
growing Bt
cotton. In China farmers are also now growing Bt
cotton.
The lack
of food security in Africa is being played off against the
success of Bt
cotton farmers in Makhathini and is being used to put
pressure on countries such as Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe to
adopt GM crops. Much has been written about the benefits
and risks of GM crops. It is widely agreed that a mere
technology cannot be the solution to food security. In
spite of this it is still the main argument that the
agrochemical companies and the US are using to promote the
technology.
Monsanto
and the US use the case of Bt. cotton in Makhathini in the
following ways:
¤ &nb
sp; To push the moral argument that
by being cautious about GE crops, European consumers are
depriving Africans of this new opportunity to feed
themselves. To this end, one of the farmers was taken to
the UK to promote their experience in Makhathini.
¤ &nb
sp; The US trade representative,
Robert Zoellick, had a 'chance' meeting with a farmer (TJ
Buthelezi) to hear of the success of Bt. cotton with small-scale farmers.
¤ &nb
sp; Farmers and journalists from
African countries, such as Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe are
taken to visit Mr ButheleziÕs fields and hear his success
story.
¤ &nb
sp; The US is taking the EU to the
World Trade Organisation, saying that the EU's labeling
restrictions on GE form an illegal trade barrier, and
contribute to hunger by discouraging Africans from
importing and growing GE. When Zoellick made this
announcement earlier this year, Mr Buthelezi was standing
next to him to 'prove his point.'
¤ &nb
sp; USAID has taken Zambian and SADC
policy makers and scientist on a tour of Makhathini to
persuade them to soften their stance on GM food aid.
¤ &nb
sp; The results from Makhathini is
widely published, even though these are highly questionable
and even researchers that have found positive results,
acknowledge that the situation still has to unfold for the
full impact to be realised.
MAKHATHINI IN
CONTEXT
Geography and
Environment
The region
has six interlocking ecological zones that run from north
to south parallel to the coastline. At the foot of the
Lebombo mountain range, lying to the east is the Pongola
Zone, which encompasses the floodplain and extensive pan
system of the Pongola River. As it meanders towards the
sea, it has given birth to a series of oxbow lakes and pans
that are teeming with fish and bird life. Each year the
spreading waters of the Pongola River replenish these pans
as it floods its banks after the summer rains. The floodplain
tract is about 70km long and between half and one km
wide. It plays
a major role in the economic life of the people of the
region. The
alluvial soils have considerable agricultural
potential. In
general it is on these rich alluvial soils that the
small-scale farmers undertake cotton
production.
The
ecology of the Pongola floodplain is finely tuned but is
being increasingly disturbed, by the damming of the Pongola
River at Jozini, and the increasing population and
agricultural pressure on the
floodplain.
The
Pongolapoort Dam was constructed in the 1960s for the
growing of sugar cane under irrigation on the Makhathini
Flats and with the construction of the dam the natural
flood cyclce has been disturbed. It is now necessary to
artificially flood the system to ensure the fish spawning
and plant growth continues as naturally as possible. The
advantages of a major late summer release are
threefold.
Firstly fish spawn in summer and they need flooding
in order to stimulate spawning; this will ensure a steady
supply of fish in the winter and following early summer
months.
Secondly the pans will be filled and this will
sustain them and so prevent them from drying out during the
winter months.
At the same time regular flooding will improve the
quality of grasses and grazing throughout the whole
year. Thirdly,
annual summer floods will allow the people to plan their
cropping strategies better and so avoid crop destruction
through flooding.
The release of water from the
Pongolapoort (Jozini) dam
The Ubombo
Farmers Association, who are the farmers planting the most
Bt cotton in the area, is a very strong organized
group. They
need the water from the Pongolapoort Dam to be released a
few weeks earlier than the agreed time in order to start
planting the cotton early. According to Mr Buthelezi the maturation
period for Bollgard is on average two to four weeks shorter
than that of other hybrid cottons in that area and provided
that the flooding occurs earlier in the year, they can
plant earlier and have more than one harvest period,
increasing their yield substantially.
The
normal flooding period had been established over the years
through Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) in
consultation with the Floodplain farmers in order to best
suit their normal subsistence crops, mainly maize and
beans. The
Ubombo Farmers Association has lobbied DWAF for the earlier
release of the water during 2000 and has been
successful.
People have raised the early release of water as an
issue, as those farmers who are planting vegetables on the
floodplains loose their crops on a regular
basis.
Socio-political - land
The main owner
of the Makhathini Floodplains is the State. This land is held
in trust by the Minister of Land Affairs and is thus
directly under the control of the DLA. There is still no
security of land tenure for the inhabitants of the
Floodplains, although it is the policy of the DLA to return
all State land to the inhabitants of the area. On the Makhathini
there has been no consensus as to whether this should be in
the manner of free hold land (land owned by private
landowners) or whether it should become communal land (land
under the jurisdiction of local tribal authorities), which
in the case of KwaZulu-Natal means the land is returned to
the Ingonyama (King) Trust.
The lack of
security of tenure is regarded as one of the main
constraints to the development of viable commercial
agricultural enterprises. The threat of removal and
insecurity of land tenure severely affected agriculture
production in the area. This is still evident today in that very
few farmers would plant any permanent crop, such as sugar
cane.
90%
of the farmers involved in cultivation in the Ingwavuma and
Ubombo districts, are deficit farmers. This means that
they do not produce enough for their own household food
requirements.
The 10% farmers producing surplus products are
primarily found along the Pongola River floodplain.
BT
COTTON IN MAKHATHINI
Cotton has been
produced for over 15 years in the Ingwavuma/Ubombo region.
The reasons why farmers continue to grow it are two-fold:
1.) It is a
resilient crop that can withstand the harsh climate
experienced in the region, and 2.) the farmers are assured
of a market for this cash crop. It is important to note that the harsh
climate of the region precludes the cultivation of most
crops under dry land conditions. Cotton is one crop that can be
cultivated under these harsh conditions. In initial years
cotton production was done exclusively by dry land farmers
on approximately 3ha land units.
Many people
working on the floodplain believe that cotton growing is
inappropriate with the flood plain management system due to
its growing season, the amount of pesticides used, and
because it is a very important and sensitive ecosystem.
Planting of
Bt. cotton on the
Makhathini Plains started in 1997 when it was introduced by
Monsanto and Delta Pine with the support of the Department
of Agriculture and the Landbank. Four Makhathini farmers
participated in the first trials and soon farmers were
purchasing and planting the seeds. During the
1997/8-planting season the Bt. cotton plant,
sold as Bollgard, was introduced to the small-scale farmers
of the Makhathini area. This crop was attractive to the farmers
because they were told that it would reduce the amount of
insecticide spraying needed. At the same time the Department of
Agriculture's Makhathini Research Station started planting
trials of Bollgard to establish the yield potential. This was done under
the auspices of the Agriculture Research Commission (ARC).
Generally new cultivars are planted in trials for at least
two to three years and must show that it has proven itself
before it is released to be planted by farmers.
The total size of plots that the
farmers have access to, varies from 2ha to 30 ha. None of
the farmers interviewed kept any record of purchases,
yields, or amounts of insecticides sprayed. It can be safely
assumed that hardly any small-scale farmer on the
Makhathini keeps farming records or financial spending
records. Much
of their financial lay-out for seeds, fertilizer,
insecticides or herbicides, ploughing and agricultural
tools is done through Vunisa, where records are kept for
those farmers who are receiving loans from Vunisa or the
Land Bank.
These records are confidential and not
available.
Monsanto
has donated US$10 000 to the Ubombo Farmers Association for
the purchase of planters for the 2001[2]. T.J. Buthelezi, who
has rented out some of his hectares of land to Delta Pine
and Monsanto for the planting of Bt. cotton field trials, chairs this
farmers association.
The message being sent out to farmers is that should
you use Bollgard, you will be rewarded in multiple ways:
better yields and funding to purchase farming equipment.
Each
farmer purchasing Bollgard seed must sign a Monsanto
Technology Agreement before they can receive the seed. The
grower agrees to the following:
- To use the seed for planting a
commercial crop for only one
season
- To plant a refuge as part of
the insect resistance management
strategy
- To not supply any seed
containing Bollgard to any third
party
- To not use or provide seed
containing Bollgard to anyone for crop breeding,
research or seed production
- To not ratoon any Bollgard
cotton
- To allow Monsanto agents to
inspect the grower's fields in order to ensure that
the correct refuge areas have been
planted.
It is
clear that the farmers do not understand what they are
signing.
During a survey in 2001, only one of twelve farmers
planting Bollgard had been thoroughly informed of the
contents of the contract signed. Only five farmers of the
twelve farmers planting Bollgard were aware of the need to
plant refuges.
Of these only three were planting
refuges.
Insecticide
spraying brings challenges to communities such as those
living on the Makhathini Floodplains. They can only
afford the cheapest insecticide, which is often the most
poisonous and from the older varieties on the market. Often they are
unable to read instructions and although many farmers know
how to apply the insecticide, it is not clear whether they
train their labourers thoroughly. Water for dilution of the insecticide is
taken from the same source as that used for collection of
water for human and household consumption, resulting in the
potential pollution of drinking water.
ANALYSIS AND
CONCLUSION
South Africa is under the
spotlight as the first country in the world in which
small-scale farmers are planting genetically modified
crops. Since 1997, farmers in the Makhathini floodplains of
northern Kwa-Zulu Natal have been growing Bt cotton,
reportedly with high levels of success and adoption. This
is now Monsanto's flagship project and no time has been
lost in generating propaganda to convince the rest of the
world of the alleged benefits of genetic engineering for
small farmers and food security. But this project might
also be Monsanto's Trojan horse, in the words of one
researcher.[3] There are many
reasons why it would be a fundamental mistake for the rest
of Africa to accept the apparent success of this project as
a reason for adopting other GE crops. The circumstances
under which Bt cotton was introduced cannot easily be
replicated.
High level of support to
farmers leading to high
dependency.
The
success of the Makhathini farmers has only been possible
with high levels of support and infrastructure which is
makes for exceptional circumstances compared to the vast
majority of African farming conditions. Combined
efforts of the South African Department of Agriculture,
Monsanto, Vunisa (a private company) and the Land Bank (a
government bank) have guaranteed farmers easy access to
markets for their crops and credit to purchase inputs.
Farmers have thus become highly dependent on outside actors
- and highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the private
sector.
Because
cotton is a cash crop, farmers get loans to buy inputs.
When they harvest, the input cost is immediately deducted
from their payout. There are now two ginneries on the
Flats, so they do not have a problem with transport or
markets. While many farmers farm dryland cotton, the most
successful Bt cotton farmers farm either on
the floodplain or is part of the irrigation scheme. The
companies owning the technology and selling seed, provide
extension services and support to the farmers.
Unequal access.
The
marketing hype around Makhathini fails to reveal that it is
not the most marginalized producers that are benefiting
from Bt cotton, but rather the larger cotton producers that
have access to land and - most importantly - to credit to
enable purchase of the very costly Bt cotton seeds. The
Landbank provides
credit, Vunisa assess farmers and screen them. Credit
worthiness plays a major role in the adoption of
Bt cotton.
The average loan recovery is 40 - 60%.[4]
Researchers from Reading
University confirm that there is a potential that
socio-economic problems could develop between farmers who
can afford to take up the technology and those who cannot
and so widen the poverty gap within the community. In
selecting farmers, Vunisa targeted larger producers, the
group that is more prone to take risks.[5]
Cotton
farming forms only a small part of the local economy and
the Bt cotton growers form less than 5% of the local
population.
Debt
trap.
Those
farmers able to access credit are locked in a debt-cycle.
This has to be seen in the context of cotton being a cash
crop in Makhathini for the past 20 years. Farmers have been
dependent on inputs from government and companies before
the arrival of Bt cotton. The new seed is at least twice as
expensive at non-GE seed, leading to higher debt than would
otherwise be the case. The Land Bank provides loans to
cotton farmers because they get cash in hand as soon as
they deliver to the ginneries. In other words there is a
ready market for their cotton. This puts the farmers in a
very precarious position and a failed crop will mean that
they will not be able to buy seed the next season. During
the 2002 - 2003 season, the area experienced a drought and
it was reported [6] that
many farmers have lost their entire crop, GE or non-GE. The
difference being that those who planted GE crops had higher
input costs and subsequent debt that they now have to pay
off.
Moreover,
since South Africa has liberalised its cotton market,
farmers have become increasingly vulnerable to price
fluctuations determined by the US markets. Reductions in
cotton prices will be devastating for small farmers already
operating under marginal conditions and during the recent
Doha round of WTO negotiations, the dilemma of African
cotton farmers was high on the agenda.
During the recent cotton season, South African
farmers have planted less cotton due to weak world prices
and several ginneries did not operate at all. This led to
big job losses in the industry.
Short-lived benefits.
Reduced
insecticide use is seen as one of the advantages of Bt
cotton at Makhathini, and initially farmers have said that
they use less insectcides. However, it seems that spraying
for bollworms has continued even among farmers that have
adopted the technology. While Bt cotton may have initial
management benefits, experiences from around the world
suggest these to be short-lived. No variety can remain
resistant to all pests and diseases and in the province of
Mpumalanga, commercial farmers planting Bt cotton are
already returning to normal spraying patterns because of
outbreaks of secondary insects such as aphids, leafhoppers
and stinkbugs. There have also been cases of farmers losing
their entire crop because they did not spray. Commercial
farmers in South Africa can take this risk, but for
small-scale farmers, the loss of one harvest can be
catastrophic.
Monsanto
has already applied for a permit for the commercial release
of Bollgard II, which contains two Bt genes. The reason for
putting Bollgard II on the market is because insect
resistance develops and Bt cotton with the
"stacked" Bt genes is now needed to be effective.
This has come six years after Bt cotton has been released
in South Africa and five years after Makhathini farmers
started converting to Bt cotton.
Farmers are planting GE cotton without
information.
Farmers planting Bt cotton do so with no
understanding of the technology, or of their obligations
under the licensing contracts they sign with Monsanto.
Biowatch research has revealed that farmers understand
their contracts to mean that in the case of a crop failure,
the seed will be replaced. They are not aware that they
should plant a refuge, that the insects will develop
resistance over time, or that during some seasons they will
have to spray for unexpected insect outbreaks. Although
Monsanto is happy to spend millions of dollars in promoting
this case and 'educating' the global public, it is not at
all bothered to ensure that the most basic information of
all is conveyed to its peasant clients. Even the Provincial
agricultural officers in the district had no idea that GE
crops are being planted or even what it is.
Community Access to Resources under
Threat.
Thousands of people depend for their livelihood on
the water cycle of the Makhathini floodplains, fed by the
Pongola River. Since the Jozini Dam has been built, the
water is released annually to imitate this natural cycle
and ensure that the cycles of nature and farming can
continue as before. Because of the introduction of the
input from outside agencies such as Monsanto, the Bt cotton
farmers have become a strong enough lobby group to lobby
for the premature release of water from the Jozini Dam to
suit their needs. This however, has an impact on the rest
of the community growing food crops and other crops on the
floodplain as the premature flooding destroys their crops
and thus food security. The timing also does not correspond with
the natural flooding time of the floodplain and will have
an impact on the breeding cycle of the fish, affecting
another food source and so starting a cycle of scarcity.
Current Research Data raises more questions than
answers.
The
first data coming out of Makhathini in 1998 and widely
quoted by Monsanto and some prominent SA scientists
actively promoting GE crops, were stating that there was a
20% increase in yield, and sometimes in a more enthusiastic
mood, figures of up to 30% have been quoted. The truth is
that in 1998, four farmers were handpicked, Bt cotton was
planted on their fields and their results have been used
ever since. It has not been taken into account that the
farmers probably used inferior seeds before and that any
improved variety, Bt or not, would have given an increase
in yield. The next year Monsanto spent R1million on a
failed socio-economic study, the main reason being given
that the researchers did not take into account that small
scale farmers do not keep written records. Subsequently
several researchers have published results, seemingly based on
those records. Overall, the data presented by different
researcher and the industry varies enormously making it
difficult to come to any clear conclusion.
Farmers
in Makhathini have been fairly positive about
Bt Cotton,
but the benefits may have been overrated by many in their
eagerness to sell the product. Clearly the situation still
needs time to unfold and a proper socio-economic and
environmental study still needs to be done that takes into
account the real cost of growing cotton and GM cotton.
There has not been a single environmental impact study done
on GM crops in South African and Makhathini is no exception
and this is a cause for much concern.
Reduced
choice is tied integrally to increased dependency and once
a farmer decides to plant GE crops, it becomes very
difficult to rethink this choice. As is the case elsewhere,
farmers in South Africa buying GE cotton have to sign
growers' contracts obliging them amongst other things to
use the seed for only one season; to plant a refuge as part
of an insect-resistance management strategy; not to supply
any seed containing Bt cotton to any third party; and to
exclusively use the company's chemicals. Many farmers in
the US have been forced by Monsanto to destroy their crops
for not complying with this agreement and several court
cases are pending. This is alarming, especially for
small-scale farmers, who traditionally save and exchange
seed and, as the case at Makhathini illustrates, are
unlikely to be able to read contracts, let alone understand
their contents.
* This analysis is a result of three years of monitoring and research on Bt Cotton in South Africa and internationally. It included interviews with small- scale farmers in Makhathini, commercial Bt cotton farmers, the industry and other roleplayers.
[1] Email: [email protected]
[2] Farmers Weekly, 17 November 2000.
[3] Kuyek,Devlin.2002. Genetically engineered crops in Africa:The implications for small farmers. Draft research paper for the African Network.
[4] Thirtle C, Beyers L, Ismael Y and Piesse J (2003). Can Gm-Technologies Help the Poor? The Impact of Bt Cotton in Makhathini Flats, KwaZulu-Natal . World Development Vol. 31, No. 4 pp. 717-732
[5] Ibid.
[6] Sunday Times, 14 April 2003